Description

In a global economy, anticompetitive agreements and transactions often have transnational repercussions. In the absence of a global enforcer of antitrust or competition law, States have, since the Second World War, increasingly resorted to self-help. In other words, they have exercised unilateral jurisdiction over restrictive business practices they considered harmful to their economy, even when those practices originated abroad. Not surprisingly, this has often led to serious sovereignty concerns. This book analyzes whether, and to what extent, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in cartel and merger matters is in fact lawful under international law. It does so from a transatlantic perspective, with an emphasis on practice in the United States and the European Community. The book mainly focuses on the use of the controversial effects and implementation doctrines of jurisdiction. Without turning a blind eye to the necessity of those doctrines in a decentralized global economy, it proposes a number of restraining principles in order to soothe other States' sovereignty concerns.