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  6. Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts

Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts

Peter O Christensen, Gerald A Feltham, Christian Hofmann, Florin Sabac
Livre broché | Anglais | Foundations and Trends(r) in Accounting
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Description

Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts examines managerial performance measures from the perspective of timeliness, accuracy, and relevance in multi-period incentive problems. The authors use a simple linear framework where managerial actions do not affect risk and compare and contrast consumption risk for a manager's preferences with single and multiple consumption dates, respectively. Both full commitment to and renegotiation of long-term contracts are considered. Under full commitment, timely and accurate information is usually relevant and desirable; the only differences arise from the modeling of managerial preferences, through the manager's consumption risk. In particular, the timeliness of performance reports can be irrelevant; then, delaying reports is desirable if it can increase their accuracy. Under renegotiation of long-term contracts, the timeliness of information release relative to renegotiation is essential. Any information released prior to renegotiation is incorporated into an ex post efficient (renegotiated) contract and is particularly useful in insuring the manager against future consumption risk. Delayed reporting destroys this insurance value and can make late reports irrelevant, independent of the modeling of managerial preferences. But timely reports can create ex ante inefficient action incentives for managers, and then accuracy can be costly as well.

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Contenu

Nombre de pages :
92
Langue:
Anglais
Collection :

Caractéristiques

EAN:
9781638280842
Date de parution :
31-10-22
Format:
Livre broché
Format numérique:
Trade paperback (VS)
Dimensions :
156 mm x 234 mm
Poids :
145 g

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