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Winning the Firefight is not Enough

The Need for a Multidimensional Approach to Stability Operations

Ian C Hope
Livre broché | Anglais
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Description

This monograph establishes a theoretical foundation for stability operations doctrine. It defines a tactical approach to 'limited warfare', applicable across a wide range of stability scenarios, with the hope that the reader will gain a higher level of understanding of these complex types of missions. Planning and executing stability operations is somewhat problematic, given the US Army's almost exclusive doctrinal focus on conventional operations since the introduction of Active Defense in 1976. Efforts are being made to correct this. Recent drafts of FM 100-5 Operations, FM 100-22 Stability Operations and FM 100-40 Offensive and Defensive Tactics, address the Army's role in stability operations, and elevate the importance of these operations in relation to offensive and defensive combat missions. This monograph attempts to contribute to the current discussion concerning stability operations doctrine. The monograph uses documentary evidence to present a general theory of limited war, putting into context the various types of military interventions that are classified as stability operations. It uses contemporary ideas of 'chaos' and 'complexity' to define the environment into which stability forces deploy. In order to overcome the complexities inherent in modern social conflict, the monograph suggests adherence to three general principles. These are derived from a synthesis of Clausewitzian concepts, counter-revolutionary theories and general systems theory. The first principle is that the people remain the most important element in a conflict, the operational center of gravity for all sides. The second principle holds that Intelligence is critical to seizing and maintaining the initiative. The third principle is that there must be a low-level integration of military combat and non-combat, and civilian and information operations under one common operational concept. Primary and secondary source evidence of the US Army's pacification of the Philippines 1898-1902 is

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Contenu

Nombre de pages :
64
Langue:
Anglais

Caractéristiques

EAN:
9781288333066
Date de parution :
21-11-12
Format:
Livre broché
Format numérique:
Trade paperback (VS)
Dimensions :
189 mm x 246 mm
Poids :
131 g

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