Description

The international aid industry's experimentation with political economy analysis is on the road to nowhere, so long as major assumptions remain unchallenged; namely, that development is a public good and reform comes from experts and enlightened reformers working in partnership on new institutions, whilst development failures are the result of information failures or perverse incentives, as collective action problems.

This book provocatively argues that donor efforts to think and work more politically have not adequately addressed, to date, the structural dimensions of power and interests and the political economy of the aid industry itself. The authors address these 'elephants in the room' via a lively critique of technical and agency-focused political economy approaches and the sustained application of an original typology for evaluating the commitments of reform actors and strength of their alliances with donors.

Highlighting the need for donors to engage more tactically and opportunistically to achieve incremental improvements in the lives of the poor, this book will be a valuable resource for development practitioners and scholars of international political economy and international development.