This monograph explores the validity of current United States Army Doctrine as it relates to enabling the future United States Army Objective Force in achieving the qualities outlined in the 2001 Objective Force White Paper as the Army begins its "transformation". Specifically, adaptability and agility are hallmark qualities of learning organizations and as such, the monograph further examines whether soldier and unit performance reflect these learning disciplines. Generative learning disciplines must exist within The Army and its culture if it is to dominate and win across the full spectrum of conflict. The monograph opens by examining the necessity of the Army becoming a learning organization. The evolving operational environment is increasingly complex requiring adaptive forces using simpler solutions and achieving decisive action quicker than the opponent. Learning organizations have these qualities and more. From there, a hypothetical learning model outlining the "Objective Force Disciplines", while taking into account learning theory and Objective Force concepts, serves as a benchmark for comparison. Next, these "new" disciplines measure up against the recent NTC Trends Compendium (May 2001) and The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study (June 2001) determining whether current doctrine is capable in making the Objective Force a reality. The problems found with current doctrine as it relates to the Objective Force Disciplines revolve around Army culture and overwhelming amounts of data. The current Army culture is not able to cultivate the generative learning qualities because soldiers and leaders struggle with high tempo, mistrust, and micromanagement. These issues manifest themselves in sinking commitment levels to the unit. Learning organizations need commitment to function. In addition, units are unable to make decisions in a timely manner due to a growing misunderstanding and mismanagement of overwhelming data. Consequently, units will n

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